Intel v. ULSI System Technology by Rozman, Mark J.
Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 1 | Issue 2 Article 7
March 1994
Intel v. ULSI System Technology
Mark J. Rozman
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark J. Rozman, Intel v. ULSI System Technology, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. 373 (1994).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol1/iss2/7
INTEL V. ULSI SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, the world has witnessed great advance-
ments in the power and availability of electronics and computer
technology. Computers have become exponentially more powerful,
and the size of these computers has steadily decreased from room-
sized mainframe computers to laptop personal computers. This
progress is due in no small part to the semiconductor industry,
which has pioneered vast advances in the size and computing
capacity of semiconductor chips, including microprocessors, the
brains of any computer.'
The semiconductor industry itself has undergone many changes
during the past several decades. Since the 1960's, upstart compa-
nies, which pioneered the first generation of microprocessors, have
evolved into industry giants.2 These companies developed as
vertically integrated businesses that both designed and manufac-
tured their semiconductor chips.' In the past decade, however, a
new breed of semiconductor businesses, called "fabless" semiconduc-
tor companies, 4 has appeared throughout the industry.5  These
companies design semiconductor chips, but go to an outside source
for manufacture of the chips. These outside manufacturing sources
are commonly known as "foundry" manufacturers, and the
alliance between the designer and the manufacturer is called a
' See, e.g., FRANCO MALERBA, THE SEMICONDUCTOR BusiNEss 11 (1985) (discussing
technology behind semiconductor chips); Brian E. Whitley, Joint Ventures in the Semiconduc-
tor Industry, 10 COMPUTER/L.J. 581, 582-83 (discussing size of semiconductor industry and
American companies' market share of industry).
'See generally Nancy Rutter, The Great Patent Plague, FORBES ASAP, Mar. 29, 1993, at
59, 66 (listing founders of semiconductor companies and their prior affiliations).
' See Andrew S. Rappaport & Shmuel Halevi, The Computerless Computer Company,
HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1991, at 72-73.
" These companies are termed "fabless" because they are strictly design operations and
do not have any fabrication facilities.
' See Rappaport & Halevi, supra note 3, at 72-73.
'See, e.g., Richard H. Abramson, When the Chickens Come Home To Roost: The Licensed
Foundry Defense in Patent Cases, COMPUTER LAW., Mar. 1993, at 1.
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foundry relationship.7
In addition, licensing practices in the semiconductor industry
have changed. In the initial stages of the semiconductor boom
during the late 1960's and early 1970's, the large corporations
designing and manufacturing microprocessors readily cross-licensed
their patent portfolios.8 These agreements allowed the contracting
companies to build on the inventions of others, which rapidly
advanced the computing capacity of microprocessors. In the 1980's,
however, the larger industry members replaced this atmosphere of
cooperation with a more isolationist approach.9
Despite this trend, many industry members are still bound by
broad cross-license agreements entered into in the early days of the
industry.' ° Additionally, many members are involved in other
license agreements and second-source agreements." During the
past decade, these agreements have led to a good deal of litiga-
tion.12 An example is Intel v. ULSI System Technology, Inc., a
recently litigated patent suit resulting from a cross-license
agreement. This Comment will examine Intel and the suit's
7 A semiconductor industry foundry relationship involves two parties, a chip manufactur-
er and a chip designer. The foundry agreement generally requires the chip designer to
provide the manufacturer with the design and specifications for the chip to be manufactured.
The manufacturer then takes this information and fabricates the semiconductor chips with
its raw materials and equipment. The relationship between the manufacturer and designer
is mutually beneficial. The manufacturer will likely have the capacity to perform the task
without any further expenditures of capital, and the designer will realize his chip fabrication
needs without having to purchase the capital-intensive equipment necessary for the
manufacture of semiconductor components. See, e.g., Rappaport & Halevi, supra note 3, at
74-75. Examples of foundry arrangements are found in several recent district court cases.
See Cyrix Corp. v. Intel, 803 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Tex. 1992); Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology,
Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Or. 1991).
s See Rutter, supra note 2, at 59, 62 (describing early willingness to cross-license).
'Id. (discussing evolution of semiconductor industry in 1970's and 1980's).
10 See, e.g., Cyrix Corp., 803 F. Supp. at 1200 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
1' A second-source relationship requires a primary manufacturer to have a second
company capable of producing the primary's devices, which assures a purchaser of a
continuous supply of the devices in case of problems with the primary manufacturer. These
problems may be production related or business related. Motorola v. Hitachi, 750 F. Supp.
1319, 1335 (W.D. Tex.), vacated, 923 F.2d 868 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
" E.g., Texas Instruments v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n (Atme/), 988 F.2d 1165
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (involving license agreements); Cyrix Corp., 803 F. Supp. at 1200 (involving
cross-license agreement); Intel v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (involving cross-license agreement); Motorola, 750 F. Supp. at 1319 (involving second-
source agreement).
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implications for the semiconductor industry.
II. THE FACTS OF INTEL
In Intel, 3 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 4 (Fed-
eral Circuit) held that a license agreement between two semicon-
ductor industry corporations provided a valid patent exhaustion, or
"first sale," defense to a patent infringement claim for a third party
using the licensee as a foundry for fabrication of semiconductor
devices. 5 The implications of allowing this defense to patent
infringement claims are substantial, as many semiconductor
industry members are involved in factual situations similar to that
in Intel.
16
The events leading to the Intel litigation began in 1983. In that
year, Hewlett-Packard (HP) and Intel entered into a licensing
agreement that granted royalty-free, nonexclusive cross-licenses on
all patents and patent applications held by each company until the
year 2000.17 The purpose of the agreement was to allow each
company to proceed in the research and development of new
products free from fear of litigation.
18
" Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 923 (1994).
" The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 to
provide exclusive appellate jurisdiction for certain cases, including patent law cases. See
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as
amended in sections of 28 U.S.C.). One of the primary objectives behind the creation of the
Federal Circuit was to eliminate forum shopping in patent cases, which resulted from
nonuniform patent doctrine in the circuits. Chemical Eng'g Corp. v. Marlo, Inc., 222
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 738, 740 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
6 See, e.g., Daniel Holden, Intel Suffers Setback, ELECTRONIC NEWS, June 21, 1993, at 1.
Prior to this decision, district courts have come out on both sides of the issue. E.g., Cyrix
Corp., 803 F. Supp. at 1214 (holding patent exhaustion doctrine applicable); Intel v. ULSI
Sys. Technology, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1467, 1475 (D. Or. 1991) (holding patent exhaustion
doctrine inapplicable). Moreover, the Federal Circuit, in contrast to the present case,
previously held that the patent exhaustion defense did not apply to a similar arrangement.
Intel v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
'6 E.g., Cyrix Corp., 803 F. Supp. at 1200; Motorola, 750 F. Supp. at 1319; Abramson,
supra note 6, at 1-2.
17 Brief for Appellant at 8, Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (No. 92-1116) (granting to each party "an irrevocable, retroactive, nonexclusive,
worldwide, royalty-free license under all patents and patent applications owned and
controlled by Intel").
18 Intel, 782 F. Supp. at 1474.
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In 1988, HP and ULSI System Technology (ULSI) entered into a
relationship, generally known in the semiconductor industry as a
foundry arrangement. 9 The arrangement called for HP to manu-
facture a math coprocessor, designated the US83C87 ('C87)
coprocessor,20 based on ULSI's design and specifications.2' The
ULSI coprocessor performs a function similar to and competes with
Intel's 80387 ('387) coprocessor. In fact, ULSI introduced the 'C87
as a plug-compatible replacement for the '387.
In 1991, Inte122 learned of the existence of ULSI's '087 coproces-
sor and brought suit in the U.S. District Court for Oregon alleging
patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271.23 Specifically, Intel
sought a preliminary injunction enjoining ULSI from infringing or
inducing infringement of its patent. After examining the elements
required under 35 U.S.C. § 28324 for issuing a preliminary
injunction, the district court judge granted the injunction, holding
that Intel had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the mer-
" See generally Brief for Amicus Curiae Chips and Technologies, Inc. at 3, Intel v. ULSI
Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (No. 92-1116) (detailing operation of
foundry relationship).
20 Use of a coprocessor enables a microprocessor to perform calculations at a considerably
higher rate of speed.
21 The origin of the design for ULSI's coprocessor is a highly litigated issue. In June
1993, a California superior court jury determined that ULSI founder George Hwang and a
former employee were not guilty of criminal appropriation of trade secrets. Certain Intel
documents (four boxes full) had been found in the garage of the employee, who had
previously worked on Intel's '387 coprocessor design team. Other documents had been
discovered at the company itself. In finding the defendants not guilty, the jury decided that
the documents, including the draft of an Intel data book, were not trade secrets. See Daniel
Holden, Intel Suffers Setback, ELECTRONIC NEWS, June 21, 1993, at 17; Rutter, supra note
2, at 59-60.
22 Intel is the assignee of U.S. Patent Reissue 33,629 ('629 patent), entitled "Numerical
Data Processor," which was incorporated into the design of the Intel line of coprocessors,
including the '387. The patent is a reissue of U.S. Patent 4,338,675, originally granted to
John F. Palmer et al., July 6, 1982.
2Section 271(a) reads in part ". . . whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any
patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
' "The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions
in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable." 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988). A court
considers four factors in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction: (1) the
movant's likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the
movant; (3) the balance of hardship between the parties; and (4) the public interest. See We
Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int'l Corp., 930 F.2d 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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its. 25
ULSI, however, successfully moved for a stay of the injunction
order pending appeal in the Federal Circuit.2" On appeal, a three-
judge panel (with one judge dissenting) of the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction and
held that ULSI, not Intel, showed a likelihood of success on the
merits.27 Intel then unsuccessfully filed a combined petition for
rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc.' Subsequently,
Intel appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, but was
denied certiorari.29
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCuIT's ANALYSIS
In Intel, the Federal Circuit held that the patent exhaustion
doctrine is a valid defense for a third party using a licensed
manufacturer to fabricate its infringing design. According to the
court, the sale of the 'C87 coprocessors from HP to ULSI was a
valid "first sale" by a manufacturer licensed by Intel. As such, it
exhausted Intel's right to enforce its patent.30
Specifically, the majority considered the contract between HP and
ULSI as a sales agreement resulting in the sale of 'C87 coprocess-
ors from HP to ULSI. 31 The majority focused on the title of the
HP-ULSI agreement-"Terms and Conditions of Sale"-and held
that the nature of the transaction clearly contemplated a sale of
coprocessor chips.32 In reaching this decision, however, the
majority disregarded the unique and complex relationship involved
in a foundry arrangement. This relationship occurs in part because
the lines between the buyer and seller and the products sold are
2' Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1467, 1476 (D. Or. 1991).
2 Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., No. 92-1116 (Fed. Cir. January 14, 1992).
'7 Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 923 (1994).
' Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21733 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26,
1993).
'2 Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 923 (1994).
30 Intel, 955 F.2d at 1569.
si Id. ULSI urged this finding. Brief for Appellant at 9, Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology,
Inc., 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (No. 92-1116).32 Intel, 995 F.2d at 1569.
3771994]
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blurred.33
Although HP was not a party to the suit, the license agreement
between Intel and HP was the majority's primary reason for finding
that ULSI had a valid "first sale" defense. The majority broadly
interpreted the agreement to hold that ". . . HP's conceded right to
sell the chips deprives Intel of any claim of infringement, as long
as HP sold the chips."' Yet, in reaching this conclusion, the
majority ignored the prevailing purpose of the license agreement
and the intention of the parties in granting the cross-licenses-to
free the parties from fear of needless litigation. 5
In addition, the majority rejected the several arguments proposed
by Intel to counter application of the patent exhaustion doctrine.
Intel first claimed that there was no sale of goods by HP to ULSI;
rather, HP only supplied a service-fabrication of the semiconduc-
tor wafers. The majority, however, held that the HP-ULSI
agreement contemplated a sale of goods. 6 The court similarly
rejected Intel's claim that HP could not have sold the coprocessors
to ULSI because HP never owned the intellectual property rights
to the chip design.3 ' Finally, the court refused to accept Intel's
argument that transfer of the chips was a sublicense from HP to
ULSI (which the Intel-HP agreement prohibited).38
In contrast, Judge Plager, who wrote the dissent, disagreed with
the majority's application of the patent exhaustion doctrine to the
HP-ULSI foundry arrangement. First, he viewed the Intel-HP
license agreement as not authorizing HP to allow third parties to
use the agreement to infringe Intel's patent with impunity.
39
Second, Judge Plager argued that the doctrine did not apply
because ULSI's alleged infringing product was not the product that
' See Brief for Appellee at 6-9, Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (No. 92-1116). HP does not sell a final coprocessor to ULSI; rather, it sells the
product of the photolithography process, in which silicon wafers are imprinted with Ul.SI's
coprocessor design. Id.
34 Intel, 995 F.2d at 1569.
5Id. at 1573.
"Id. at 1569.
37 id.
8 1Id.
"Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 923 (1994).
[Vol. 1:373378
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was licensed to HP.4 Finally, he differed from the majority by
characterizing the HP-ULSI transaction as service oriented.4'
Thus, Judge Plager held that HP's sale of coprocessors to ULSI was
not a sale that cut off Intel's patent rights. 2
IV. EXISTING LAW
The primary issue in Intel is the applicability of the patent
exhaustion doctrine to a licensed foundry arrangement. The patent
exhaustion doctrine, also known as the first sale doctrine, provides
that once a patent holder places a patented invention into the
marketplace, he has exhausted any infringement claim.' Thus,
under the doctrine, once the patent holder sells the patented
invention, he is estopped from making an infringement claim
against anyone obtaining the invention from the original purchas-
er. "
This judicially created doctrine first appeared in patent cases in
the mid-1800's. In Bloomer v. McQuewan,3 the first case to apply
the doctrine, the Supreme Court held: "And when the machine
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the
limits of the manufacturer. It passes out of it, and is no longer
under the protection of the Act of Congress." 4'6  The Supreme
40 Id. at 1575. Note that Intel's '387 coprocessor was the patented product and thus part
of the HP-Intel license agreement; ULSI's 'C87 coprocessor was designed by ULSI and thus
not involved in the license agreement.
41Id.
42 Id.
43 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942).
"Id. at 250.
455 U.S. 539 (1852).
46 Id. at 549. In Bloomer, the patent owner conveyed the right for a second party to
make, use, and sell the invention in Pennsylvania. The second party later transferred to a
third party, the plaintiff Bloomer, the exclusive right to make, use, and sell a limit of fifty
inventions in Pittsburg County. Earlier, however, the patent owner had granted to the
defendants the exclusive right to make, use, and sell in Pittsburg County, forcing Bloomer
to bring suit against the defendants. Id. at 547-48; see also JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT
LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 88.05(1Xa) (1992) (giving facts and background of
Bloomer v. McQuewan).
19941 379
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Court refined the doctrine in the 1873 case of Adams v. Burke.'
In finding no infringement by a purchaser from an authorized
licensee of the patent holder, the Court stated:
In the essential nature of things, when the patentee,
or the person having his rights, sells a machine or
instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives
the consideration for its use and he parts with the
right to restrict that use. The article, in the lan-
guage of the court, passes without the limit of the
monopoly."
The Supreme Court further detailed the doctrine with respect to
license agreements in United States v. Univis Lens Co."9 There,
the Court held that the first sale of an article manufactured under
a patent places the article beyond the reach of the patent holder's
protected rights. Specifically, the Court noted:
The full extent of the monopoly is the patentee's
"exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention
or discovery." The patentee may surrender his
monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or in
part by the sale of an article embodying the inven-
tion. His monopoly remains so long as he retains the
ownership of the patented article. But sale of it
exhausts the monopoly in that article and the paten-
tee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent,
control the use or disposition of the article.'
More recently, the Federal Circuit has held that the patent
exhaustion doctrine applies to certain license agreements similar,
47 84 U.S. 453 (1873). In Adams, the patent owner assigned the invention to different
companies, each for an exclusive area. A purchaser from a company whose exclusive area
was a ten-mile radius from Boston then took the invention and used it outside the designated
area. Id. at 453-55; see also SCHLICHER, supra note 46, at 8805(lXc) (giving facts and
background of Adams v. Burke).
Adams, 84 U.S. at 456.
4316 U.S. 241 (1942).
"0 Id. at 249-50.
[Vol. 1:373380
8
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol1/iss2/7
INTEL V. ULSI
but not identical, to a foundry agreement such as that at issue in
Intel. In Unidisco, Inc. v. Schattnr,51 the court held that sales of
a patented product by a distributor, who purchased the products
from a licensee acting within the scope of his license, were
protected from patent infringement claims.52 Although the court
did not expressly invoke the patent exhaustion doctrine, it used
similar language.'
Notably, the Unidisco facts are distinguishable from the facts of
Intel. First, the licensee in Unidisco was manufacturing products
that were identical to those authorized by the inventor. Thus,
these products were not the design of a third party as occurred in
Intel, in which ULSI designed the 'C87 coprocessor. Second, the
third party in Unidisco purchased a final manufactured product.
In contrast, in Intel, ULSI did not purchase finished coprocessors
from HP, but rather purchased the result of intermediate process-
ing steps. Finally, the patent holder in Unidisco received a royalty
for every product the licensee sold to the third party, whereas the
patent holder in Intel received no royalty for any sales by ULSI.
Therefore, because the facts surrounding the license agreements in
Unidisco and Intel materially differ, the cases are distinguishable.
In Lisle Corp. v. Edwards,54 the Federal Circuit again used
language resembling the patent exhaustion doctrine to extricate a
defendant from an infringement claim.' There, the court held
that a licensed manufacturer's sale of a patented tool to a third
party retailer did not constitute patent infringement. Like
6' 824 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988). In Unidisco,
Schattner, the patent holder, entered into an exclusive license, with an express agreement
not to sub-license, with Girard to manufacture and sell the patented liquid sterilant. Girard
then arranged for an exclusive distributorship with Unidisco, who sold the sterilant to the
public. When Unidisco sued for a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, Schattner
counterclaimed against Unidisco for patent infringement. Id. at 966-67.
2 Id. at 968.
"Id. ("Resale of the product by Unidisco could not infringe the patent if Unidisco
purchased the product from an authorized seller.").
4 777 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In Lisle, the patent holder, Edwards, granted a
nonexclusive license to Lisle to manufacture and sell the patented tools. Lisle then sold the
tools to Snap-On retailers for resale to the general public. Edwards brought a patent
infringement suit against Snap-On. Id. at 694.
5Id. at 695 ("The sales by Lisle were authorized by the nonexclusive license agreement.
Resale did not create a sublicense. Edwards is not entitled to a royalty payment each time
a tool is resold.").
1994] 381
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Unidisco, Lisle is distinguishable from Intel because it involves a
final manufactured product, which is identical to the one autho-
rized by the patent holder, and royalty payments to the patent
holder for every product the licensee sells to the third party.
In a recent decision, Intel v. United States International Trade
Commission (Atmel)," the Federal Circuit refused to apply the
patent exhaustion doctrine to a license agreement. In Atmel, the
plaintiff, Intel, brought suit against a group of companies, alleging
infringement of patents incorporated into the design of Erasable
Programmable Read-Only Memories (EPROMs).5" One defendant
offered the patent exhaustion doctrine as a defense to the infringe-
ment claim. The court held that the decision whether to apply the
doctrine would depend on the court's construction of the license
agreement. Specifically, the court found:
If the Intel/Sanyo agreement permits Sanyo to act as
a foundry for another company for products covered
by the Intel patents, the purchaser of those licensed
products from Sanyo would be free to use and/or
resell the products. Such further use and sale is
beyond the reach of the patent statutes.58
By conditioning the applicability of the patent exhaustion doctrine
on construction of a license, the Atmel court seems to have poten-
tially expanded the doctrine beyond its traditional boundaries.
This expansion would occur by extending the defense to encompass
products different from those expressly included in a cross-license
agreement, such as that between Intel and HP.
56 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
"7 EPROM's are semiconductor chips used as memory devices in computers. Id. at 824
n.4.
58 Id. at 826. In Intel v. ULSI, Intel argued that this passage was mere dicta rather than
binding precedent. Brief for Appellee at 20, Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d
1566 (No. 92-1116). However, the majority followed the statement in finding for ULSI. Intel
v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
923 (1994).
382 [Vol. 1:373
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V. ANALYSIS OF INTEL
In Intel, the majority held that the patent exhaustion doctrine is
a valid defense to an infringement claim for a third party using a
licensed foundry to manufacture allegedly infringing products.59
This holding stretches the patent exhaustion doctrine beyond its
previous limits and threatens to withhold from a patentee the
rights conferred it by the patent grant.60 In contrast, the dissent's
approach provides a more reasonable and equitable result by
considering both the intentions of parties who initiate a cross-
license agreement and the technical aspects of a foundry relation-
ship when deciding whether to apply the patent exhaustion
doctrine.
The majority's analysis is flawed in several respects.61 First,
the majority interpreted the HP-Intel license agreement to be
broader than either party contemplated at the time of the con-
tract. 2 As a result, the doctrinal element that there be an
authorized sale of the patented product was unsatisfied.' Second,
the patent exhaustion doctrine requires that the accused product
be the patented invention." Here, however, Intel accused ULSI
of producing an infringing copy of its patented article, not the
59 Intel, 995 F.2d at 1571.
60 A patent grants to the patentee ... for the term of seventeen years... the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States
...-. " 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
6' Appellate review of a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction is limited
because "the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is within the discretionary authority
of the trial court." H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 387 (Fed.
Cir. 1987). Further, "[tihe grant of a preliminary injunction, if not based on legal error or
a serious misjudgment of the evidence, is reviewable only to ascertain whether the grant was
within a reasonable range of discretion." Id. ULSI argued that the district court committed
such an error by not allowing ULSI to use the patent exhaustion doctrine as a defense. See
Brief for Appellant at 6-7, Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(No. 92-1116) (summarizing ULSI's arguments on appeal, including district court's denial of
patent exhaustion defense). This legal question is thus clearly within the scope of Federal
Circuit review.
62 Intel, 995 F.2d at 1573 (discussing intentions of parties in entering into license
agreement).
3 Mallinkrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussing
requirement of authorization).
" United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) (discussing doctrine's
requirement that infringing device be patented article itself).
11
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patented article itself. Finally, the court incorrectly found that the
HP-ULSI transaction was a simple sale of goods,' allowing the
"first sale" defense to be used. These errors will be discussed in
turn.
For the patent exhaustion doctrine to apply, the patentee must
authorize the sale of the patented product." After considering
testimony and affidavits offered by Intel and HP,17 the trial court
found that both parties intended the license agreement to limit
subsequent transfers of patented products.' The dissent provid-
ed additional information evidencing lack of authorization. It
stated that "t]he cross-license notes that both parties are 'engaged
in continuing programs of research and development,' and that both
parties 'want to increase their freedom of design by obtaining a
license.' "69 Thus, it is clear from the agreement that the parties
intended to use each other's patents to further their research and
the development of new products, and not to manufacture the other
parties' patented products for unlicensed third parties.
Moreover, in finding the required authorization, the Federal
Circuit majority attempted to distinguish the Intel-HP license
agreement from a nearly identical agreement between Intel and
Sanyo in the Atmel decision,7 ° in which the court held that the
patent exhaustion doctrine was not a valid defense for a third party
65 Intel, 995 F.2d at 1569.
68 Mallinkrodt, 976 F.2d at 703.
67 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing details of Intel-HP cross-license).
' Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (D. Or. 1991) ("[Imt is clear
that neither Intel nor Hewlett-Packard intended their agreement to be so broad as to grant
the other party the power to sublicense any patent granted under the Intel/Hewlett-Packard
agreement."). This finding is corroborated by the practices prevalent in the semiconductor
industry at the time of the license agreement. See generally Cyrix Corp. v. Intel, 803 F.
Supp. 1200, 1205 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (giving facts and findings about licensing practices in
semiconductor industry); Richard H. Abramson, When the Chickens Come Home To Roost:
The Licensed Foundry Defense in Patent Cases, COMPUTER LAW., Mar. 1993, at 1-3
(presenting overview of semiconductor industry from early 1970's to late 1980's and
conditions that led to many cross-licenses like the Intel-HP agreement).
6 Intel, 995 F.2d at 1573.
70 Intel v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n (Atmel), 946 F.2d 821, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("Intel hereby grants and will grant to Sanyo an [sic] non-exclusive, world-wide royalty-free
license without the right to sublicense except to its Subsidiaries, under Intel Patents which
read on any Sanyo Semiconductor Material") (emphasis added). Note that, except for the
emphasized words, the license is nearly identical to the Intel-HP agreement. See supra note
17 (providing text of Intel-HP agreement).
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using a licensed manufacturer as a foundry.71 Due to the similar
structure and purpose of the license agreements, the majority
should have more carefully and more narrowly interpreted the
Intel-HP license agreement.
In addition, the primary element of the patent exhaustion
doctrine-that the product in dispute be the patented product
itself-is not satisfied in Intel.72 In the cases in which the Su-
preme Court developed the doctrine, the accused infringing
products were the patented products themselves.73 Here, however,
the accused infringing device was not the patented product itself.74
ULSI designed its 'C87 coprocessor, which infringed on the Intel
'387, and created its own mask works and magnetic design tape for
use in manufacturing the chips.75  Despite its similarities of
design, name, 76 and function, however, the ULSI coprocessor was
not identical to Intel's patented product and therefore the doctrine
should not have been applied.
Furthermore, the nature of the HP-ULSI transaction should
7 1Atmel, 946 F.2d at 828. In declaring the defense inapplicable, the court adopted the
reasoning of the administrative law judge who presided over the initial proceedings. Id.
"Noting that there was no evidence indicating that Intel knew Sanyo might act as foundry
for other unlicensed companies, that Sanyo's license in paragraph 3.5 was world-wide and
royalty-free, and that Intel would not receive any further consideration no matter how many
companies went to Sanyo for parts that infringed Intel patents, the ALJ posed the
hypothetical question: Could Intel have intended that any company in the world could get
Sanyo to make its parts without having to get its own license from Intel on Intel's patents?"
Id.
72 See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) ("The patentee may
surrender his monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or in part by the sale of an article
embodying the invention. His monopoly remains so long as he retains the ownership of the
patented article. But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee may
not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article.") (emphasis
added).73 E.g., id. (patented invention was lens blanks; subject of prosecution same); Adams v.
Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873) (patented invention was coffin lid; infringing product same);
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852) (patented invention was planing machine;
infringing product same).
7' The patented invention was a numeric data processor, U.S. Patent 4,338,675, while the
infringing device was a math coprocessor, designated (by ULSI) as the US83C87.
71 See Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1467, 1472 (D. Or. 1991) ("Intel
has shown that the US83C87 coprocessor infringes on every element of claims 5, 7, and 8.
Accordingly, Intel has made a clear showing of infringement by ULSI.").76 ULSI's coprocessor name, US83C87, was clearly similar to Intel's name, 80387. In the
district court action, Intel also alleged violations of sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
the federal trademark act. Id. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125(a) (1988).
13
Rozman: Intel v. ULSI System Technology
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1994
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
prevent application of the patent exhaustion doctrine. For the
doctrine to apply, there must be a valid sale of the patented
product." But as noted by the dissent, "the overall context of the
contract demonstrate[d] that the sale was of services, measured per
chip, rather than sale of technology.7" As a foundry source for the
'C87 coprocessor, HP provided fabrication services to ULSI. These
services included the engineering expertise and performance of
processes required to produce the chips. Moreover, the HP-Intel
contract itself indicates that the transaction involved the provision
of services and not a sale of goods. For example, in the contract,
ULSI purported to "warrant[ ] that it owns all the rights to the
information and processes including specifications, designs,
instructions and Confidential Information provided to HP."79 This
retention of the intellectual property rights asserted by ULSI
signifies a services agreement because it contemplates HP's role as
a middleman between ULSI and the consumer market. Further, it
is important that HP did not perform all of the fabrication services;
ULSI performed the final processing steps, such as testing, cutting,
and packaging the wafers into individual integrated circuit
packages.' Thus, HP's actions seem more like the rendering of
manufacturing services than the sale of a finished patented
product. HP simply performed intermediate steps in the manufac-
turing process.
77 See Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 539. In fact, the term "patent exhaustion" is synonymous with
"first sale," implying that a valid sale is required for application of the doctrine.
78 Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 923 (1994).
79 Id. at 1574. The dissent argued that ULSI's warranty and indemnification clauses are
further proof that HP and ULSI did not consider the HP-Intel cross.license to grant authority
for the manufacture of infringing chips. Id. at 1575. But note that indemnification clauses
are standard contract clauses, and according to the general rule, not proof of liability for the
indemnitor's inducement of infringement by the indemnitee. Charles E. Miller, Some Views
on the Law of Patent Infringement by Inducement, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 86, 150-51 (1971).
' See Brief for Appellee at 6-9, Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (No. 92-1116) ("Pursuant to the foundry services agreement, HP bought blank
silicon wafers and imprinted circuits onto them according to ULSI's schematic designs. HP's
foundry services comprise only limited intermediate steps of the following ten-step process
needed to make the patented math coprocessor .. . ."); Cyrix Corp. v. Intel, 803 F. Supp.
1200, 1205-06 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (discussing typical steps taken in design and fabrication of
semiconductor devices).
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In addition, the HP-Intel relationship suggests a final argument
against application of the patent exhaustion doctrine. As two
significant entrants in the semiconductor industry market, Intel
and HP entered the cross-license agreement for a specific pur-
pose-each sought to research and develop new products free from
litigation."' Arguably, this agreement placed the parties in a
fiduciary relationship with respect to the patents involved in the
cross-license.
A district court has attached such a fiduciary relationship to
parties to a second-source agreement.8 2  As there are many
similarities between a cross-license agreement and a second-source
agreement, this fiduciary relationship concept could be analogiz-
ed to the present case. A fiduciary relationship would create a duty
for each company to protect the other's patents by refraining from
entering foundry agreements such as the one in Intel, in which
infringing products are involved. A violation of this duty would
then open the foundry manufacturer to a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty.
The preceding arguments highlight the weaknesses in the
majority's application of the patent exhaustion doctrine and raise
questions about whether the doctrine should apply to a licensed
foundry relationship. There are, however, arguments supporting
the decision reached by the majority. This Comment will address
three such arguments.
First, ULSI argued that the patent exhaustion doctrine applies
not only to a patented article, but also to a partially manufactured
article. There is support for this proposition in United States v.
s' See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing cross-license agreement and
parties' intentions).
82 See Motorola v. Hitachi, 750 F. Supp. 1319, 1335 (W.D. Tex.), vacated, 923 F.2d 868
(Fed. Cir. 1990) ("(T]he Court is of the opinion a fiduciary relationship in fact exists between
Motorola and Hitachi, both parties acting as fiduciaries to the other. The reason for this is
the unique circumstances in which the parties find themselves. The microprocessor industry
is highly technical, in a constant state of flux and worth millions, if not billions, of dollars
in profit to the entity which can invent the fastest, most efficient and productive device. The
constant stress and competition of those in the microprocessor race is staggering .... Each
company is intimately aware of and responsible for the life blood of the other. . .).
a' In particular, both types of agreements contemplate two competitors sharing
technological information. A cross-license grants each party uses of the other's patents. A
second-source allows the second party to learn the primary's proprietary designs.
3871994]
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Univis Lens Co., in which the Supreme Court stated that:
[W]here one has sold an uncompleted article, which
because it embodies essential features of his patent-
ed invention, is within the protection of his patent,
and has destined the article to be finished in confor-
mity to the patent, he has sold his invention so far
as it may be embodied in that particular article.8
4
Here, Intel granted HP a license to its patent, the numeric data
processor. Then HP, through its foundry agreement with ULSI,
performed the intermediate processing steps necessary to place
ULSI's infringing design on silicon wafers. HP subsequently sent
the wafers to ULSI for further processing. ULSI argued that these
wafers were an embodiment of the patent, and as such, were
immune from infringement by the patent exhaustion doctrine. The
language in Univis upon which ULSI relied discusses a situation in
which the patentee sold an uncompleted article. In Intel, however,
the licensee sold the uncompleted articles; thus, arguably, the
language in Univis does not apply to Intel.
ULSI also argued that the Federal Circuit decision in Atmel,
which involves a foundry agreement nearly identical to that in
Intel,85 provides precedent for applying the patent exhaustion
doctrine. In Atmel, the court stated 6 hypothetically that if a
licensee were authorized to operate as a foundry, the patent
exhaustion doctrine would apply." This statement, however, is
arguably dictum to the court's opinion because the Atmel court
found that no such authorization took place."
The passage from Atmel leads to the third possible argument in
support of the majority opinion. Applying Atmel to Intel, one must
examine the Intel-HP agreement to determine if it provided
authorization for HP to act as a foundry. Because the cross-license
316 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1942).
85 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing background of Atme decision).
" See supra note 58 and accompanying text (quoting passage from Atmel decision).
8? Intel v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n (Atmel), 946 F.2d 821, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
" Intel unsuccessfully argued that this part of the decision was mere dicta and not
precedent. Brief for Appellee at 20, Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (No. 92-1116).
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agreement neither specifically authorizes nor forbids foundry
agreements,"9 ULSI's claim of a valid defense depends on contract
interpretation. 90 The majority interpreted the contract as a broad
agreement that would allow such a foundry relationship. This
interpretation, however, did not consider the parties' intentions in
entering into the agreement.9' The dissent, in contrast, examined
the parties' intentions and held that because no intent to authorize
a foundry relationship existed, the defense was inapplicable. This
approach is more equitable because it conforms to the intentions of
the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the arguments supporting
application of the patent exhaustion doctrine are not convincing.
Moreover, the likely effect of Intel on the semiconductor industry
casts further doubt upon the propriety of applying this doctrine to
a licensed foundry situation. An analysis of Intel and its implica-
tions for the semiconductor industry will turn on the following
considerations. First, technological advancement is increasing at
an astronomical rate, and the patent laws must be continually
adapted to keep abreast with these advancements.92 Second, since
the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, patents have developed
as an increasingly valuable economic asset for holders of these
rights.93 Third, applying an economic analysis to the facts of the
case results in a decision contrary to the majority opinion.
Intel involves complex technological products and complex
industrial relationships. The patent exhaustion doctrine developed
89 See supra note 17 (providing text of Intel-HP agreement).
'0 In its appellate jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit performs a de novo review of contract
interpretation. See, e.g., Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc. v. Stone, 980 F.2d 1433,
1434 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating appellate standard for contract interpretation).
9' Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 923 (1994) (comparing Intel-HP cross-license with nearly identical Intel-Sanyo
cross-license from Atmel decision).
" Examples are numerous. For instance, a recent decision by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office extended patent protection to certain genetic engineering creations, such
as the Harvard Mouse. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866, granted on April 12, 1988. The Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences also recognized computer screen displays as design
patents in Ex parte Strijland, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1259 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992).
" See, e.g., Tamni Harbert, Patent Portfolios Emerge As Corporate Money Makers,
ELECTRONIC Bus., Apr. 16, 1990, at 53 ("The increasing value of intellectual property has
made semiconductor patent portfolios both a prime corporate asset and strategic competitive
weapon, respectively capable of generating hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue and
shutting a competitor out of a market.").
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in cases involving both simple products and license agreements. 94
Consequently, to keep patent law current, the Federal Circuit must
refine the doctrine to account for such changes. Additionally,
patent law must change as the policies and theories underlying the
patent system evolve. Notably, commentators are suggesting a
closer link between economic analysis and the theories underlying
patent laws. 95 This link should lead to changes in the patent
laws, including the patent exhaustion doctrine. 6 Such changes
would give patent owners the ability to preserve their patent rights
while they license or otherwise authorize another party to use the
patent.
Furthermore, the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 heralded
a new era in the protection of patent rights.97 The court has
increased the strength of patents, holding in a far greater propor-
tion of cases that patents are valid and infringed than in pre-
Federal Circuit times.9 8 Accordingly, since 1982, industry leaders
have taken patent prosecution and litigation more seriously and
considered patents as valuable corporate assets. 99 Thus, given the
generally pro-patent position of the Federal Circuit, the Intel
94 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL 15-32 (1973) (discussing patent rights in terms of incentives to invest in
innovation); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, at 275-80 (1977) (explaining how patent system along with trade secrets law
enhance public welfare).
9 See John W. Schlicher, If Economic Welfare is the Goal, Will Economic Analysis
Redefine Patent Law?, J. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS, June 1992, at 12 (describing four economic
theories that underlie most ofcurrent patent laws). Schlicher suggests applying an economic
analysis to infringement rules, such as the patent exhaustion doctrine. "Economic analyis
[sic] is likely to lead to changes in these doctrines to provide patent owners greater freedom
to preserve the rights even though products obtained from an authorized source are involved
in the accused transaction at some level.-
97 See, e.g., Pauline Newman, Introduction: The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or
Judicial Activism?, 42 Am. U. L. REV. 683, 686 (1993) (describing background on reasons for
creation of Federal Circuit and effect on patent law in first ten years of existence).
98 See. e.g., ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 639-40 (2d ed. 1991)
("The [Federal Circuit] had 120 opportunities to reverse holdings of validity, and did it only
14 times. It had 112 chances to reverse holdings of infringement and did it but 10 times.
By any measure, the accused infringer who loses below has less than 1 chance in 10 of
turning things around on appeal.") (emphasis added).
" See Abramson, supra note 6, at 1-3 (discussing reasons why value of patents has
soared); Harbert, supra note 93, at 53 (providing examples of companies reaping windfall
profits from patent portfolios).
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decision is particularly perplexing because it seems to limit the
patent owner's ability to protect its patent rights.
Finally, from an economic standpoint, Intel may have dramatic
repercussions throughout the semiconductor industry. By allowing
this defense, the court is sending a message to companies that
infringing a competitor's patents is perfectly acceptable if one finds
the right foundry to fabricate the chips. In particular, this decision
threatens future technological advances in the semiconductor
industry because companies will refrain from entering cross-license
agreements and restrict research and development budgets out of
a fear of inadequate product protection.
The exponential growth and technological advancement in the
semiconductor industry from the early 1970's to the present are
directly related to the willingness of large corporations such as
Intel and HP to cross-license patents.1°° The Intel holding will
discourage such industry leaders from working together or entering
into cross license agreements. As a result, companies will ineffi-
ciently and needlessly recreate advances that would otherwise have
been available through cross-licensing. Moreover, the availability
of new products in the marketplace may be delayed by the disap-
pearance of cross-license agreements.' °
Not only may new products be delayed, but they may never
appear. The patent system rewards inventors for their labors by
granting "for the term of seventeen years ... the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the
United States." 2 This grant of exclusivity provides an incentive
for an inventor to invest the money and time required to create a
100 See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 6, at 1-3 (discussing early days of semiconductor
industry and effects of cross-license agreements on industry growth); Rutter, supra note 2,
at 59, 62 ("These new technology companies further thrived in the 1970's by embracing a
policy of broad, long-term technology cross-licensing, an industry custom that prevailed for
more than 20 years. Cross-licensing allowed companies not only to share their technical
innovations but to use each other's technologies. It was a good deal. It kept everyone out
of court and gave everyone access to technological advances.").
10 In addition to the disappearance of cross-licensing, future agreements between
competitors will be discouraged. See Intel v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566,
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 923 (1994) ("The type of cross-license involved
here apparently is not that uncommon, and likely presages a variety of new contractual
arrangements among and between industry partners and competitors.").
102 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
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new and useful product. Companies such as Intel, which spend a
great deal of money on research and development, will be less
willing to do so if they fear that any new product can be copied
with impunity by invocation of the patent exhaustion doctrine.
Declining research and development budgets would then limit the
availability of new products in the marketplace.0 3 Accordingly,
by expanding the patent exhaustion doctrine, Intel may reduce the
availability of new products in the marketplace.
Nevertheless, some would argue that an economic analysis favors
ULSI because consumers benefit most from a wide variety of
choices on the market. This argument is unpersuasive for several
reasons. First, freeing ULSI from an infringement claim encourag-
es other companies to similarly infringe patents and discourages
them from spending money on research and development.' 4
Second, consumers will be hurt in the long run, as more companies
like ULSI appear and revenues of pro-research companies drop.
This drop in revenue will further necessitate a cut in research and
development budgets and cause fewer innovative products to be
placed on the market.
Finally, alternatives existed to ULSI's search0 5 for a licensed
foundry to fabricate its coprocessors. ULSI could simply have
negotiated with Intel for a license on the patent and thus been free
of any infringement claim. 10 6  Alternatively, ULSI could have
103 See Rutter, supra note 2, at 65 (quoting Intel general counsel on R&D: "But R&D is
a bigger investment risk than ever. Our first fab [fabrication facility] cost $1 million. Now
a fab costs $1 billion, so we can't give our innovations away. We have to protect our
shareholder's investment, which is allowed by the U.S. Constitution.*).
1
o
4 See Rutter, supra note 2, at 63-64 (quoting Texas Instrument chief patent counsel on
companies like ULSI: "We had companies coming into the industry who were not innovating.
They were not investing in R&D. They were just copying technology.").
10" See Intel, 995 F.2d at 1571. The dissent creates an interesting layout of the case's
basic factual premise. But the dissent may be pleading its case too much: the selection of
HP as a foundry may have been entirely fortuitous. Yet, as fortuitous a choice of foundry
source as ULSI may have made, it should not allow ULSI to escape Intel's infringement
claim. The agreement between ULSI and HP was a separate and distinct business
relationship from the agreement between Intel and HP. The Intel-HP agreement, supra note
17, was not formulated to authorize HP to transfer Intel's patented products to third parties.
106 But see Harbert, supra note 93, at 56 ("Where licensing is an option, companies may
be raising their rates. Royalty rates have changed to reflect the increased value of patents
.... Five years ago, royalty rates fell within a narrow range, 2% to 5% of sales. Now the
range is much broader, from 2% to as high as 40% in the semiconductor industry . . .");
Rutter, supra note 2, at 65 (quoting Intel general counsel on cross-licensing: "We won't cross-
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used Intel's patent specifications and Intel's '387 coprocessor to
reverse engineer and design around the patent.1 17 Either choice
would have legally placed ULSI coprocessors on the market.
VI. CONCLUSION
In holding that the patent exhaustion doctrine applies to licensed
foundry arrangements, the Federal Circuit has endangered the
patent holder's fundamental right to enforce the exclusivity
conferred it under the patent laws. The decision also bestows upon
undeserving companies the ability to free themselves from infringe-
ment claims simply by aligning with a licensed foundry. Conse-
quently, to allow this use of the patent exhaustion doctrine would
encourage the seeking out of foundries with existing license
agreements and lead to widespread abuse of the doctrine.
MARK J. ROZMAN
license copycat companies ... that make an imitation of our product, who don't spend
anything on R&D .... We do not sue companies that contribute to the industry through
R&D. If we both innovate, then we both add value.').
07 See Harbert, supra note 93, at 58 (noting that other companies have thrived by reverse
engineering and designing around, such as Integrated Information Technology (IIT): "On
release, the IIT chips ran an average of ... nearly three times as fast as the '387 without
even the hint of infringement .... By 1993, IIT commanded between 10 and 15 percent of
the math coprocessor market.").
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